relations were suspended 7 . It was in this social, historical, political and regional context of the 19th century that
Iranian patriotic sentiment was born and that Persian politicians and intellectuals saw their interests converging towards France 8 . With regard to intellectuals, they were mainly influenced by the revolutions of 1789 and 1848
and by writers some of whose works had been translated into Persian during the second half of the 19th century (Victor Hugo, Emile Zola, Honoré de Balzac, etc.) 9 .
This tendency was re-enforced by the political choice of the Persian government to send Iranian students to France so that on their return they could reform the administration system. This cultural turmoil ended with French becoming adopted in 1902 as the official and diplomatic language for those wanting to work in administration 10 .
This student migratory flow increased substantially in 1908 11 , following the repression and the bombarding of the parliament by Muhammad Ali Shah and it transformed itself into a quest for political asylum 12 . This tendency was reinforced by the coup 13 these are the important moments for the Iranian diaspora in France before the revolution of 1979. Despite this tradition of an Iranian migratory flow since the 19th century, the number of Iranians in France has remained limited and only 5,944 have been recorded at the onset of the 1979 revolution. But in 1982, three years after the revolution, there were 12,876, that is to say the number had tripled compared to 1978. Six years later, in 1985, the number had quadrupled, up to 22,484 persons 16 .
Why This Inflow? What Does This Uninterrupted Increase Mean?
Based on these figures which question the existence, identity, even the unity of an Iranian diaspora 17 , on the one hand, we can ask ourselves in what way this Iranian diaspora has emerged and increased quantitatively in France since the birth of the Islamic Republic, and, on the other, which factors have contributed to the process of the diasporaisation of Iranian migration? What are the main reasons for the outpour of Iranians in the 7 Iran's failure was the result of an external factor, namely Napolean's defeat and an internal one: The lack of political skills of King Fath Ali Shah who didn't understand Persia's geopolitical situation and spent his time in the harem; the mighty efforts of Prince Abbâs Mirzâ who was leading a difficult war and failed to save the situation. Cf, Mohammad Reza Zarrin Koub (2011) , Rouzgârân, Tarikhé Iran, Az Aghâz tâ seghouté saltanaté pahalavi, in Persian, (Les temps jadis, L'histoire de l'Iran, Du commencement à la chute de la dynastie Pahlavi), Téhéran, Edition Sokhan, 1390, pp. 795-797. 8 To understand 19th century Iran, cf. Florence Hellot-Bellier, France-Iran: quatre cents ans de dialogue (2008) , Paris: Association pour l'avancement des études iraniennes, pp. 26-40. Also, Yan Richard (2006) , L'Iran, Naissance d'une république islamique, Paris, Editions de la Martinière, Homa Nategh (1994), Kârnâme yé farhanguiyé farangui dar Iran, 1837 -1921 Homa Nategh (1994) , Kârnâme yé farhangui yé farangui dar Iran, 1837 Iran, -1921 Afary (1996) , The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 Revolution, -1911 Abrahamian (1982) , Iran, between two revolutions, Princeton University Press, pp. 261-287. 15 Farhad Khosrokhavar (1993) , Utopie sacrifiée, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences politiques, pp. 43-88. 16 The source for these two figures comes from the Ministry of the Interior following a telephone interview carried out on March 6th 2000 with a person in charge in the in charge the statistics Service. 17 The term "diaspora" has recently been used by researchers in relation to Iranian migratory flows since the birth of the Islamic Republic. Applying its definition will be the object of another paper. Here we are using it according to Robert Cohen's meaning: "A strong awareness of an ethnic group which is maintained over a long period and based on its impression of feeling distinct" with a common history and concept of a common "destiny" Cohen, Robert (2006) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and finally demography, the growth of the Iranian population from 33,708,744 persons in 1976 to 55,837,163 persons in 1991 20 .
These factors could make up, on a macro-analysis level, the structural elements of Iranian migration since the Second World War. They enable a better understanding of Iranian migration in France in the context of a quantitative analysis. This analysis that the rest of this article presents, requires first of all some methodological comments and observations with regards to Iranians in France.
Intellectual Poverty
The first remark focuses on intellectual poverty and indigence. During the research we began in 1998, we interviewed Iranians in Paris and enquired if they knew the number of Iranians in France. We collected from these people, a wide range of figures which were often very different from what we were able to obtain from competent authorities. We received answers such as 40,000, 62,000 21 , 160,000 and even sometimes 200,000
Iranians in France; most of the people interviewed gave the figures at random and could not indicate what they were basing their estimations on. These gaps between estimations and scientific data, are a reminder that even in the most concrete domains, the reliability of figures is subject to caution. For many Iranians, the general trend is "common sense" and information by word of mouth, which reflects the lack of interest in research concerning this population in France 22 . The most convincing hypothesis to explain this gap relies on the fact that the circle of migrants in Paris is highly politicized and hostile to the current regime.
Reinforced by the lack of a general study on the displaced Iranian population, these migrants tend to overestimate the number of Iranians in France, thinking that it underlines the repressive force of the Iranian regime. Thus an over politicized and not innocent subject.
A Neglected Iranian Migratory Field
The second remark focuses on a neglected Iranian migratory field. There are numerous reasons which have prevented researchers, whether Iranian or not, from carrying out exhaustive work on Iranian migrants. Amongst these reasons we must mention the rapid evolution of circumstances following the revolution of February 1979, the intensity of the migratory flow (around 180,000 people leave Iran each year) 23 as well as 18 To understand macro and micro factors in a better way, see D. S. MASSEY and all (1993) , "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal", in Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, For a deeper understanding of these four transformations cf. Nader Vahabi (2011) the absence of a great longstanding experience on stays abroad. In addition, for Iranian researchers, revolutionary euphoria, conditions for intellectual work, (indigence of data, the absence of motivation to study an ethnic minority) and the illusion of a return to the home country in the near future have not encouraged work on Iranian migration. And more especially since, these studies don't have any interest for the host country which has no problem with this migration and is afraid of complications in its relations with the regime in place 24 . As a result, our problematic, following a sociological enquiry with fifty migrants, in semi-directed interviews, between 2000, and 2010, is a little different from problematics concerning other diasporas in France and there are three points to be made about it. First of all, it is not about a labour migration but a non-work migration. The first migrants, since the 19th century, were knowledge exiles and the second category, as from the 20th century, made up of political refugees. Next, second characteristic, Iranian migrants do not constitute a homogeneous group. The Iranian diaspora is constructed around very varied entangled facts: a legal or illegal migratory trajectory and path, discrepancy between generations, gender bias, ethnic origin, migration for study, a political project and especially political and social diversity. Finally, the general trend with settled migrants is more in favour of commercial and artisanal activities and less for structural and institutional jobs because of difficulties in transposing social and cultural capital in the host country.
So the central hypothesis of this article is that the Iranian francophone diaspora, born historically in the 19th century, would nurture more on cultural, professional and political affinities than the needs of a simple work migration and this would be the very fabric of the motivation of Iranian migration since the Iranian revolution of 1979. However, in the years 2000 it falls in line with the characteristics of a transnational migration-breaking away from its classic profile as an economic, financial, and political elite-presenting a very complex, heterogeneous social aspect which by its movements defies the sovereignty of States, just like a cyclone through a plain, landing in France or elsewhere.
We are going to verify this hypothesis through a demographic study of the different arrival waves to France during these three decades, and for each wave we are quoting two interviews within the framework of this article. To date, we have carried out 75 interviews on the Iranian diaspora in France.
Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile
Before carrying out a demographic analysis to better discern the migratory reality in France since the birth of the Islamic Republic, it is important to give precisions on our sources. Two sources have provided statistics on the Iranian population in metropolitan France: OFPRA (the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) and INSEE (the National Statistics Office). Each source has its own particularities and work methods. We are going to analyse them successively.
OFPRA (National Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)
For nearly 40% of the Iranian population in France recorded on December, 31, 2010, 7,605 A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
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In addition, referring to paragraph 4 of the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, each person persecuted for his action in favour of freedom (conventional asylum) can also apply for political asylum, as well as political actors, trade unionists, and actors from the civil society, because of their commitment towards establishing a democratic regime (fundamental rights and freedom) 27 .
The Iranian migratory dynamic in France entered a very important phase after the Left came to power in 1981, as you can see in the following table. 
The Four Great Migratory Waves
The first wave, 1978 to 1988, began in 1978 , several months before the revolution and was mainly of royalist tendency, at this time individuals couldn't ask for political asylum; it was only in 1981 that France accepted to give political refugee status to Iranians. During the entire period of the Pahlavi dynasty, Iranians could stay without problems, even although some of them were involved in politics. The Embassy of the Shah's regime renewed passports with a certain spirit of tolerance and facility so that Iranians did not have to ask for political refugee status Iranians who arrived in France during the great wave of refugees in the 1980's represent a range of very heterogonous political tendencies which include the traditional right, the royalist tendency opposed to the revolution, some generals from the former regime, technocrats having undergone purges just after the revolution (accused of collaborating with the imperial regime), University professors and teachers, the majority of leaders from political organizations, independent personalities from the civil society, revolutionary actors having participated actively in the revolution, as well as the radical left who had the surprise of seeing the Islamic government turn against all these tendencies in order to eliminate them from the social body. The origin of departure was mainly for political reasons but also linked to the war between Iran and Iraq. As far as the socio-economic profile is concerned the majority of witnesses confirm that the population of migrants was essentially from an urban middle-class, more or less cultivated, generally qualified and well aware of the western way of life, although this didn't always prevent them from having a drop in status in the host country 34 .
Interview With Abdol Karim Lahhidji 35 , Born in 1940, Exiled in Paris April 9, 1982, President of the League for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran (LDDHI) and President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
After the revolution, freedom of the press was progressively abolished. During 18 months, the headquarters of the newspapers were attacked, notably at the beginning of the war between Iran and Iraq. In 1980, the Iranian headquarters of the Human Rights Association was seized. Each day, the vice tightened on us; as from 1981, I was constantly nervy because I felt that the revolutionary guards (Pâsdârân) could attack me, either at my home, or at my office. In the second half of the month of Khordâd 1360 (around June 5, 1981), I made the decision to no longer go home; one day the Pâsdârân attacked my house and confiscated all the documents connected with my activities on Human Rights. As from Hafté Tir (June 28, 1981) , following an attack on the Headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, I went into complete hiding and I was only able to leave my refuge March 19, 1982 , when I left Tehran to take the route of exile.
Interview With MK
36 , Born 1962, Exiled Since 1982, in Paris, Member of the RPR, Married, Two
Children Municipal Civil Servant
As a woman, in Iran I was not free to decide. I felt that I was "small" because others decided instead of me. Let me give you an example regarding my divorce and "forced marriage" which went wrong. In fact, against 33 This way of politics has been confirmed in our interviews with two Ministers of the Shah's regime Abdolmajid Madjidi, 10.03.2010 my parents' wishes, I got civilly married in 1979 although I was under age. Just after the revolution, my father filed a complaint against my husband and denounced the marriage as illegitimate because he as a father had not agreed with this union. One night about two o'clock in the morning, the regime's agents came to my house with my father. They showed me the procurer's verdict cancelling my marriage. I was arrested on the spot and told I could no longer live with my husband. I had a baby of forty days old. That night I was obliged to abandon my husband and follow my father to his home 800 kilometres away. After two days at my father's place given I was an adult, my ex-husband and I decided to remarry civilly. I thought that this time my father would not be able to do anything; ten days later I handed the act concerning our new marriage to my father and fled. During the next step we were informed that my father was trying to pass a stoning verdict against my husband. He knew the "Islamic Laws" perfectly well and tried to influence Khomeini's son to obtain this verdict. Consequently we decided to leave Iran. This decision was made in complete secrecy and no one else knew about it because I feared my father might take action with the competent authorities to have my name put on the red list.
The Second Wave
The second wave, from 1988 to 1998, is characterised by a rise, second peak on the graph, 305 persons in 1991, then a drop and a stagnation of the number of asylum seekers, to reach 134 persons in 1997, the lowest figure since the beginning of the 1980s. France was no longer a land of asylum: the level of demand and the cards granted dropped, then stagnated until 1998, and Iranians then oriented themselves elsewhere.
The 1990s decade was of great social significance, immediately following the opening up to reform of the regime instigated by Presidents Rafsandjani and Khatami. Fewer political refugees were recorded but we note that a large number of migrants left their country in the hope of accessing economic or social promotion. Indeed, with the end of the war against Iraq, in 1988, and the death of Khomeini in 1989, reasons for migrating diversified, becoming social, intellectual and cultural; moreover, it was easier to obtain a passport. The interviews reveal aspirations for another way of life; often, a first professional visit to Europe resulted in the preparation of definite migration some years later. The interviewees declared that they did not hesitate, given their difficulty integrating in Iran, to try their luck by migrating. This was a turn for Iranian migration since, contrary to its mainly illegal nature during the period 1980-1990, it was now something banal. To leave Iran officially was no longer taboo: migration institutionalised itself through training and the development of networks and it transformed into diaspora which became gradually independent from structural or individual factors which were the original cause 37 .
While networks extended and the costs and risks of migrating fell, the afflux of the Iranian diaspora became less selective in socio-economic terms and more representative of the global Iranian population.
In this wave, the socio-economic profile of the middle-class began to fade and little by little the poor appeared: trafficking of migrants became a real industry for the first time in the history of contemporary Iran. I was a civil servant in an organisation for atomic energy. After the revolution, we had problems as to the continuity of this organisation because it was said it was an organisation from the Shah's regime and they were 37 To understand better the change of a structural factor to a culture of migration, cf. MASSEY et al., op. cit., p. 444. 38 Interview in Paris November 7, 2012. thinking of transforming it into a depot for wheat! While waiting for clarification of the regime's politics, I wrote a book on the problems of atomic energy. During my work, I understood that I was a liberal and not someone ideological. The regime's politics towards people like me was to tolerate, but the direction did not give important responsibilities to liberals. We were used only to give advice. I noted that as a civil servant in the public sector, I had no future in Iran. In addition, in social relations, sometimes, in the street, a young man, basidiji, controlled my identity card and papers. My wife was also bothered for this sort of control. Let me tell you a story with an anecdote. In 1988, one day my director told me I was on the black list of individuals who were not allowed to leave Iran. After some finding out, I understood that I had been a shareholder under the Shah's regime. Given that the company had been nationalised after the revolution, members of the committee had become undesirable. After my protests, my name was taken off the black list. The origin of my departure was more social than political. This atmosphere raised a feeling of revulsion in me towards the regime. As a result, we decided to leave Iran definitely in 1990.
Interview With MM

39 , Born in 1940 in Rasht in the North of Iran, Three Children, Emigrated to
Toulouse in 1990
I did my studies until second year in High School and I no longer continued. I got married very young but I divorced at the age of 23 years while having three sons. My parents had decided on my marriage. With my three children I went to Tehran and settled there definitely. My eldest son came to France before the revolution in 1976 to continue his studies. My two other sons joined him after. I did not want my sons to remain in Iran during the war because they would have had to go to the front. Ten years later, I also emigrated, after the end of the war between Iran and Iraq. As a hairdresser, I worked 16 hours per day because my children needed the money. My apartment was also my place of work; five people were working with me. My departure from Iran was linked to a problem of affection for my children. Every year, I used to come regularly to France and leave again but in 1990 I decided to stay definitely. This was my second migration: the first was in the interior of Iran at the age of 23 and this time it was towards the exterior. I was already separated from my husband and I was alone. Some months after staying, I created the same job here. At the beginning, it was difficult because I didn't master the French language, but little by little I was able to learn the hairstyles of French women and it worked well. At the time of my departure, I brought my mother with me because she was living with me in Iran, I loved my mother and my children. She looked after the children and I worked. In 1998 my mother died after 7 years living in France. I bought a tomb and after my death, I said to my children that I must rest beside her! The soil belongs to God and there is no difference between France and Iran. I am not a modern woman but if you are good to others, in life after death it will be the same.
The Third Wave
The third wave, from 1999 to 2008, first experienced an increase in demand in 2000 (it is the third peak on the graph) which is explained by the rise in applications as from July 1999; past this alert, applications decreased and experienced first a drop (a relative drop if we compare it to the one in the years of the first and second waves) to reach the lowest figure social classes 40 . The causes for migrating were multiple with, especially, a rise in the number of economic migrants who still maintained their political backgrounds. A new element is that emigrants no longer originated exclusively from Tehran's middle-class, but were often from the north, centre, and south of Iran, with a very diverse geographical spread as regards departures. In this wave, Iranians had a tendency to choose Belgium 41 rather than France because it had become the anti-chamber to enter the easily accessible England where migrants, upon arrival, could access employment and promotion. This corresponded to a large extent with economic and social emigration undertaken by young single men, travelling alone and whose final goal was often Great Britain, another European country or North America. Another characteristic of this wave is the dynamic nature of the migratory process: According to the circumstances, migrants could increase their ambitions, modify their initial projects or postpone them to later.
Interview With Nahid 42 , Born in 1973, Exiled in Paris in 2008, Divorced, Jobseeker
I have an exceptional background because my parents have been settled in France for a long time. I came to see them during the holidays for 17 years. But after my participation in a social action, I had problems in Iran, and I therefore decided to stay here. In fact, because of the situation for women in Iran, I made this decision because women have no rights, no inheritance, no divorce. We were made wear the headscarf in public space. For two years, I have started participating in the campaign "a million signatures" for women in Iran, I have met people who participated, I have tried to help them, and it would be difficult for me to stay there. Many of these women who have done this sort of action are now arrested in Iran and many are condemned to death. The shortest time spent in prison was 21/22 days. I received a letter saying I was going to have problems if I continued. I have a child. For my child, I said to myself that I had to do something.
Interview With Hamid 43 , Born in 1971 in Iran, Divorced, Two Daughters Born in Iran, Emigrated to
Paris in 2005, Server in a Sandwich Bar
In Iran, I was an accountant but I cannot do this job in France because at present I do not master the French language. At the moment, I am working as an employee in a sandwich bar in the Les Halles area. My boss masters French perfectly. He has been here since the 1980s. He knows France well. However he has abandoned his further studies in political science and now manages this restaurant. This has demotivated me. As far as the origin of my departure is concerned, I had a violent conflict with my wife; the problem was that the family conflict then transformed into a "political" conflict. My father-in-law was in the office that supervised for the Supreme Leader of the Iranian revolution, he held a lot of influence. As soon as he understood that my wife and I were in conflict, I was under threat: I understood that I risked being arrested and imprisoned. At first, I had no problems with the Iranian government but since my family problem transformed into a political one, I was obliged to leave Iran. I had a very difficult period because I left my two daughters in Iran. 40 To understand the structural obstacles and Khatami's failure, cf. Mohammad Reza Djalili (2001) , Iran: l'illusion réformiste, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 20-50. 41 In 2000, there were 3,183 Iranian political asylum seekers in this small country. This exceptional scale put Belgium on the same level as other European countries as it welcomed a very large number of Iranians (Germany, England, and Sweden). The European and Iranian context therefore presented particular circumstances for the displacement of migrants: In fact, independent in 1992, Bosnia stopped asking for visas from Iranians as from 1998, which made Iranian illegal emigration easier via Bosnia, Greece, Italy, France and Belgium. To understand the stakes in this increase of Iranians in Belgium cf. Nader Vahabi (2011) 
The Fourth Wave
The fourth wave, from 2009 until the present day, once again showed an increase in the number of requests in 2009 and a rise to 328 in 2010 (fourth peak on Figure 1 ). This new increase was largely linked to the protest movement of June 2009 which was severely reprimanded by the regime who attacked progressive forces from the civil society 44 . During the presidential campaign of 2009, I was responsible for the publication and propaganda for the General Headquarters of Moussavi. The night of the announcement of the result, the General Headquarters was attacked and 40 people were arrested. A person amongst the people arrested gave me up. As a result, to protect myself, I left Tehran and went to the North of Iran where my son was continuing his studies. I led a clandestine life and this lasted about six months. My daughter was a graphic artist and during the campaign, she worked with me. The basidiji of Tehran University had threatened to arrest and rape her. I had a Schengen visa but I could not officially leave. I took a smuggler; I left Iran by the North-West border towards Azerbaijan in the town Nakhjavan on January 23, 2010. Next, a smuggler accompanied me to the Turkish border by motor-bike. We crossed the border on foot and arrived in the first town Van after walking for 7 hours. After a 10 hour bus ride, I arrived in Istanbul, January 24, 2010. I paid the smuggler 1,500 dollars. My destination was Canada but I didn't have enough money, so I took a ticket for Sweden since I had the Schengen visa. At the control post, they asked me how I had left Iran and why I did not have an exit stamp from Iran or an entrance stamp to Turkey. I was obliged to ask for political exile in this country, but given my Schengen visa had been delivered by France, I came to France and settled definitely here in April 2010. 
Interview
Foreigner and Immigrant, What Difference?
According to the definition of INSEE, a foreigner is a person who does not have French nationality. The term "foreigner" comes under legislative framework and can therefore be lost through naturalization. The foreigner then becomes French "through acquisition", distinguishing him from being French "through birth". The immigrant is an individual who has migrated from his country of birth where he had the nationality, towards another country where he has not yet the nationality. The qualifying adjective "immigrant" refers to a 47 TA= Increase rate. 48 TN= Naturalization rate. 49 For the male/female distribution given by the 2006 census the «secret» clause is for the age group 0 to 14 years. INSEE has indicated that there were 9,748 males (in employment and out of employment) and 8,353 females (in employment and out of employment) which give the figure 18,101. If we take into account the age group 0-14 years, the figures 11,205 males and 9,353 females in our estimation therefore seem to be reliable. 50 Figures were received from INSEE 07.02.2012. migratory flow, not to the legislative framework: even if a foreigner becomes French, he remains an immigrant. The immigrant population is therefore composed of foreigners and French through acquisition.
These basic definitions, which greatly influence public opinion, raise problems for researchers who want to clearly define Iranian residents in France because this definition of "Iranians in France" is purely administrative. It does not take into account personal experience and relations with the country of origin: an individual born in Iran, naturalised as being French, can maintain with Iranianess important identity and affective relations; he should really be classed in a specific category "Franco-Iranian". Similarly, what happens for children of Iranians born in France, will they automatically become French? These children come from the Iranian diaspora but they are not emigrants from Iran. In addition, some of them regularly return to Iran and have a cultural affinity with their parent's country. At this stage of our research we do not have a precise answer for these ambiguities which exist within INSEE's categorizations. Iranian immigration, using INSEE's definition, is relatively weak compared to that of other communities. According to the 1999 census, only 19,566 Iranians were recorded whereas there were 571,874 Portuguese, 574,208 Algerians, 522,504 Moroccans, and 174,160 Turks. In 1999, out of 4,306,094 immigrants in France, Iranians, 19,566 persons, only represented about 0.005% of the total number; this explains the invisible characteristic of this population at first glance. Table 1 shows that an increase in Iranian immigration in France began to slow down as from 1990; this means that France at this time was no longer a popular destination for Iranians compared to its German neighbour and Northern Europe 51 . In addition, some of the newly arrived, after staying two to five years emigrated again to other countries. In other words, basing ourselves on INSEE statistics, which indicate for 2006, 20,556 immigrant Iranians, we note that more time passes, more the number of naturalized Iranians increases, and at the same time, more the number of foreign Iranians decreases, which appears clearly in Table 2 . In addition, as regards distribution by age group, INSEE data on the Iranian population, recapitulated in Table 3 , show that the population had become in the years 1990 to 2006, more and more "sluggish" according to an expression used by demographists, that is to say that the percentage of the population over 55 increased and that, as a result, the active population decreased. 52 Source: INSEE 1990 , 1999 . Document received by mail February 14, 2010, forwarded by a representative from INSEE Mme Nathalie Frère. It is interesting to specify that the criteria for "age group" according to INSEE can evolve, which explains why there is 55 years in 1990 and over 60 years in 1999. For the age group 0-14 years, no information was given for the censuses in 1990 and 1999; for the census of 2006, the age group 0-14 appears in the rubric "secret" which gives the nomenclature 0-14, 25-34, 35-54, over 55 years.
To sum up, the figures from INSEE 53 and the data from Figure 1 and Tables 1-4 , also confirmed by our field study, have shown that the year 1990 was a real turning point for the Iranian migratory dynamic in France.
As from this date, the number of "foreign" Iranians stagnated until 2009 and was more or less in corroboration with the number of new arrivals, which we can note by examining the Iranian migratory flows between 2004 and 2008 according to the Minister of Immigration and National Identity (Table 2 ). However, we had no more massive arrivals of Iranians like in the period 1980 and as Tables 3, 4 and Figure 4 indicate, the population became more and more "sluggish" (5, 850 over 55 years, which is 28% of the Iranian population in France).
The Total Number of Iranians in France
By adding the number of foreign Iranians (8, 244) (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) , we obtain a total number of 23,927 legal migrants present in France in 2014. But this official figure does not correspond to the reality because statistics should include individuals who live illegally and whose files have not been admitted. For example, we have seen above that between 1981 and 2010, 4,071 political asylum requests were rejected by OFPRA. Where do these rejected go? Our field research has shown that only between 10% and 15% of those rejected find a solution in the next five years (a late regularisation) and between 5% and 10% envisage an early return to Iran. What happens then to the others, 75% of those rejected? This question is at the heart of our problematic concerning the statistic study on the Iranian population but, at this stage of our research we have no hypothesis on the future of these individuals.
However following our field work investigation in the three bordering countries France, Germany and Belgium 55 , we can estimate that in France 30% to 50% of rejected Iranians hide from the administration system because they lack prospects to find a solution to their problem of regular residency. This non-official category therefore makes the number of Iranians that can be recorded more complicated and less reliable. In addition, some Iranian students and those who come on tourist visas do not return to Iran. Based on the different interviews that we have carried out, and in light of information given by certain associations in France, we can evaluate this floating population as being between 5,000 and 8,000 persons; which added to the 23,927 persons from official statistics, gives a bracket ranging from 28,927 to 31,927 Iranians. Therefore we are rounding up this figure to 31,000 for the Iranian population for the end of year 2014 56 .
The Geographical Distribution
How do Iranians choose their city of residency in France? Has the choice of a given place been imposed on them or is it the result of a personal choice? Can the parameter "social status of individuals" be taken into account in the study of their distribution? The following tables provide elements of answer to these questions. 53 The INSEE figure does not include the Iranians who live illegally. 54 Table 5 . 55 Our enquiry in Belgium confirmed the same tendency. Nader VAHABI (2001), La migration iranienne en Belgique, Une diaspora par défaut, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. 111-112. 56 For a deeper study, cf. Nader Vahabi, Atlas de la diaspora iranienne, op. cit. pp. 170-171. According to INSEE, in 1999, the 19,566 Iranian immigrants were distributed over 97 departments, 1,795 in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants and 1,214 of them living in communes of less than 5,000 inhabitants. According to the figures in Table 5 , the majority (12,181, 62%) was settled in Ile-de-France and 35% of the 12,181 were in Paris (4,269). In order to understand the logic of the geographical distribution, Table 5 has emphasised the grouping together of a part of Iranian immigrants in big urban centres which have more than 100 Iranians. We are questioning the logic of this distribution. How can we justify it?
The statistical analyses and cartography underline a strong division Ile de France/Province: the majority of Iranians, 70%, live in Ile de France; this is partly explained by the strong politicization of this diaspora because it finds structures which enable it to keep up with Iranian politics more easily in the Paris region than in province. In addition to historical, cultural affinity and asylum factors, it is necessary to specify that the choice of France can be explained by "the theory of networks": in the zones of origin and destination, migrants' networks are composed of interpersonal ties which link migrants, former migrants and new migrants in terms of affinity, friendship, political persuasion and bonds established between members who originate from the same religious and ethnic community. These networks increase the probability of the migratory movement because they decrease the costs and risks of the displacement and reassure as to the feasibility of the migratory project for an Iranian who is on the edge of making a decision. The links between the networks constitute a form of social capital which the newly arrived can draw on to choose the town where they first settle, initiate their first application for residence, make their first housing application, look for a roof over their heads or have access to a casual job in France. The enquiry shows that most of the time these knowledge networks rebound towards employment stability. This distribution is part of the problematic of "Living together" which believes that a foreign population integrates better in the host country if it benefits from a reasonable geographical distribution, without excessive concentration, and is favourable to the acculturation of the ethnic minority in the new territory. This problematic will be the subject for a future paper.
Conclusion
The birth of a francophone elite, eager for literature and French culture, was at the origin of a migration the trace of which can be found in Montesquieu's "Persian letters," 1722 and which evolved slowly following very distinct phases. From the knowledge exile of the 19th century, we moved towards that of the political refugee in 1908. Moreover, French was recognized as the official language in administration. Iranian migration then took on another dimension after the 1953 Coup, a politicization that reached a peak with the arrival in Paris of Khomeini on August 2, 1978.
In spite of this migratory tradition, at the moment of the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty, the continuous migratory flow was still not quantitatively important: 4,000 persons before the revolution. But these flows amplified in the middle of the 1980s, linked to the downturn of the revolution into terror and the massive arrivals of refugees so that the number of Iranians emigrating to France in 1985, six years after the revolution, reached 22,484, and had quadrupled compared to 1979. In other words, the 1980s constituted a pivotal period, during which we moved from a migration of the elite to one which touched nearly all groups of the Iranian society. This new phase which included four waves that coincided with political events in Iran can be called the diasporaisation of Iranian migration. If the majority of Iranian migrants in the 1980s came from the reasonably well-off class and were born in big urban agglomerations, those in the 1990s (following the end of the war between Iran and Iraq and the death of Khomeini) and the years 2000 (following the riot at the University of Teheran in July 1999 and the failure of the reformist movement) had very diversified sociocultural profiles even coming from rural backgrounds. The socio-economic profile goes from the urban elite: lawyers, officials, journalists, teachers, doctors, nurses, magistrates, military officials, company directors, etc., to artisans, such as shopkeepers, garage owners, building contractors… and finally from the skilled labourer, on through to unskilled workers in building, restauration or removals.
This migratory flow, and its distribution which follows "the theory of networks" established in the form of political affinities, professional reasons, friendships and family ties, has led to a demographic study of the Iranian population in metropolitan France; we then identified a discrepancy between the common sense, which gave phenomenal figures about immigrants, transmitted from word of mouth, and scientific estimations that we obtained in the three sources of our study, OFPRA (French Office for the Protection of Homeless and Stateless persons), INSEE (French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), and the Ministry of the Interior. By comparing the figures of these three sources since 1980, we are estimating that there are 31,000 Iranians in France at the end of 2014.
Overall, Iranians in France constitute a population presenting considerable diversity, to the extent that we can say that in France there is not an "Iranian community" but groups of Iranians who are culturally and politically widely diversified. This peculiarity concerning Iranians in France is less one of a seemingly new "community" than the expression of a system of values where the individual outweighs the group 57 . By distinguishing themselves from the "communitarianism" of certain immigrants in France, Iranians produce integration schemes which are not very well known, different from those of an "assimilate approach" dominantly propagated by President Sarkozy in 2007. Iranian immigration, distributed well geographically, does not raise any major problems and we might ask whether this form of "ethnicity of Iranian modernism" could not act as a model for the management of other groups of immigrants; this here is an interesting path of research for the future.
